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MINNESOT' LAW REVIEW
STRICT FORECLOSURE ON LAND CONTRACTSt
By HARRY W. VANNEMAN*
T is very common practice, in contracts for the sale of land where
installment payments are to be made and title is to be conveyed
at a future date and the vendee is put into possession, for the
contracting parties to agree upon some surprisingly severe stipu-
lations which ignore any equality of equities. Usually there is a
provision that all payments must be made promptly on the very
day they fall due. Not infrequently the hour of the day is fixed.
Then the vendor arms himself with certain alternative powers
in the event of breach by the vendee; he may declare that the
contract will be terminated on notice or that all obligations of the
vendor cease, or that he may proceed to terminate the contract,
etc. A very large percentage of these contracts contain provi-
sions to the effect that all payments and all improvements made
by the vendee on his default and vendor's election, shall be for-
feited as liquidated damages, or retained by vendor as rent for
the use of the premises.
Obviously the nearer the vendee approaches a complete per-
formance of the terms of the agreement the more serious, from
his point of view, is a breach of one of the stipulations.' It some-
times happens that a vendee, because of circumstances entirely
beyond his control, fails to meet a final and comparatively small
payment, in which case the vendor has the contract so framed
that he may cut off all the vendee's interests irrespective of the
damage the vendor may or may not have suffered.
The severity of these cut-throat provisions and their frequent
use suggests at once that the vendor, in contracts of this sort,
occupies an advantageous position. The parties are generally
considered sui juris and as dealing on an equal footing, but the
fact remains that the net result of their bargaining in specific
terms of the contract is heavily in favor of the vendor. It seems
*Professor of Law, Ohio State University, Columbus.
tPerhaps the reader should be warned at the outset that this paper
deals with the minority view. Most jurisdictions have denied strict
foreclosures of all sorts.
'See illustration, footnote 98.
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hardly possible that vendees, as a class, should trust the future
with such sublime confidence while vendors, as a class, should
be confirmed pessimists. It is believed that the vendor class is
simply taking advantage of its economic position of strength to
force upon vendees the type of contract which it desires. The
suggestion has been made, which from the facts seems fairly
obvious, that in reality the parties to this type of contract are
not to be fairly considered as dealing on equal terms,2 and that
the law should protect the vendee against these stipulations for
self help.3 Not infrequently large home building and develop-
ment corporations, and even individuals subdividing large tracts
of land, equipped with form contracts carefully worked out to
safeguard their interest, deal with private individuals, often with
little or no business experience. The vendor thus arms himself
with a power so unusual and capable of unfair exercise that the
usual generalizations of legal theory ought not to control where
he is driving his hard bargain to its limit within the words of the
bargain.4
Perhaps it may be reasonable to urge at the outset that the
vendor-vendee relationship is one in which the vendee needs some
watchful protection on the part of the courts. Quite generally
the relation is compared, by analogy, to that of mortgagor-mort-
gagee. The relations are quite strikingly parallel when the
vendee -is put into possession.5 The mortgagor, however, a neces-
sitous person, though sui juris, is not permitted to place clogs
upon his equity of redemption by agreement. Should a vendee
in his contract be allowed a greater freedom with which to divest
himself completely of all his equities ?'
2(1924) 2 Tex. L. Rev. 496.
3 Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of Contract. (1921) 5 MNNxFSoTA
LAW REviEw 329, 352: "Just as the law refuses to individuals the
remedy ofi seeking redress by self help without resort to courts, so
it should regulate the remedies which they provide for themselves to
enforce their contracts, not only by refusing to enforce them, but
also by relieving against unconscionable, oppressive and ruinous exac-
tions in the nature of penalties and forfeitures."
42 Williston, Contracts, sec 791-793. See also Lloyd, (1915) 29
Harv. L. Rev. 117, 121. "Neither law nor equity has dealt adequately
with oppressive installment contracts." 156 L. T. 311. There should
be some safeguard against a vendor in a position to dictate terms.
52 Williston, Contracts, sec. 791. Some weaknesses in the analogy
are pointed out, but it is there admitted that it is almost complete
when vendee is in possession. Set (1921) 2 Wis. L. Rev. 307 for
discussion of the relationship. Ferguson v. Blood, (C.C.A. 9th Cir.
1907) 152 Fed. 98.61n Kreuscher v. Roth, (1922) 152 Minn. 320, 324, 188 N. W. 996.
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While by the decided weight of authority,7 the vendor is not
allowed strict foreclosure of a land contract, in a few jurisdic-
tions this remedy is still available to him. In an early case in
Wisconsin,8 the vendee having defaulted in making certain
deferred payments according to his contract and the vendor hav-
ing brought his action of foreclosure, the trial court directed a
sale of the property. On appeal the decree was revised, the court
holding that the decree must direct a strict foreclosure. The
usual method is for the court to fix a new date on which vendee
is given opportunity to perform his contract and, if he fails to
comply, thereafter all his interests in the contract terminate and
the vendor is restored to possession.
This decision was rendered before the legislature of Viscon-
sin had abolished strict foreclosures of mortgages and required
foreclosure by sale.9 The remedy manifested surprising vitality,
however, when it was held not to be affected by such statute."'
The court's reason for so holding was given in Church v. Smith."
Lyon, J., said:
"It is quite manifest that the statute has reference to ordinary
mortgages, which leave the fee of the mortgaged premises in the
mortgagors only to be divested by foreclosure sales 12 and not to
a security like that in the present case, which, although analogous
to a mortgage, vests or leaves the fee in the mortgagee. In the
former case a sale may be deemed necessary to divest the mort-
gagor of his fee, while in the latter case the mortgagor has pro-
duced the same result by his own act or contract, and, having
nothing but an equitable interest in the land, he may be divested
thereof by a decree or judgment of the court and a sale is tn-
necessary.'
3
it was strongly urged that the relation was similar to that of mortgagor-
mortgagee and that the court will not permit any clogging of the
equity of redemption in that case and it should with equal care guard
the interest of the vendee by disregarding a provision in the contract
forfeiting the vendee's estate if he failed to make payments promptly.
72 Cook, Cases on Equity 594, note 25; Pound, (1920) 33 llarv.
L. Rev. 833; 36 Cyc. 792.
8Button v. Schroyer, (1856) 5 Wis. 598. Same view in Todd v.
Simonton, (1867) 1 Colo. 54.
9Wis. Laws 1859, ch. 195, sec. 5, Wis. Statutes 1929, sec 278.01.
"'Landon v. Burke, (1874) 36 Wis. 378; Church v. Smith, (1876)
39 Wis. 492; contra view expressed in dissent in Dickson v. Loehr,
(1906) 126 Wis. 641, 106 N. W. 793. Similar view as to statutory
construction, Security Savings Co. v. MacKenzie, (1898) 33 Or. 209,
52 Pac. 1046; Miles v. Hemenway, (1911) 59 Or. 318, 111 Pac. 696,
117 Pac. 273.
1(1876) 39 Wis. 492.
"-Citing Wood v. Trash, (1858) 7 Wis. 566.
3It is an interesting coincidence that the very year that the
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This reason has been characterized as a "palpably fallacious argu-
ment."" The court seemed over anxious to preserve this remedial
device for use by vendors. The fact that the title to the land is
in the vendor should have afforded the court no difficulty if it
had thought it wise to require foreclosure by sale as all the
parties are before it and it would be a simple matter to direct
the vendor to convey to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale.
In Taft v. Reddy,15 the vendor sought specific performance
of the contract and requested a sale of the land. The court granted
it. Strong equitable reasons support this procedure. As a recent
writer said:"'
"The vendees' rights in the land would be protected because
they would be given an opportunity to pay the purchase price and
take title, and the vendors' rights under the contract would be
preserved, as they would be given a decree for the payment of the
full purchase price, with a right to collect it out of the land."
Such argument seems cogent in strict foreclosure cases. While
there is some suggestion that the bar in Wisconsin 7 had considered
this remedy as having fallen into disuse if not discredit, a recent
decision clearly revives it,' s and the many cases"' which have
reached the supreme court seem to indicate that it is frequently
employed. It is believed that foreclosure by sale should be the
remedy adopted in all foreclosure of land contract cases just as
in mortgages and for precisely similar reasons. Instead, how-
ever, the court clearly preserves the strict foreclosure remedy to
the vendor.
One of equity's recognized functions is to relieve against for-
feiture and penalties, but strangely the courts, in many of these
foreclosure cases in denying any relief to the vendee, declare
Wisconsin court announced this doctrine the supreme court of Michigan.
in Fitzhugh v. Maxwell, (1876) 34 Mich. 138, declared that there could
be no strict foreclosure of land contracts, "To apply the doctrine of
strict foreclosure to the vendor's lien, and not to an express mortgage
is a direct reversal of all rules and in violation of every equitable
principle and analogy."
"ADean Pound in (1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 833.
'sTaft v. Reddy, (1926) 191 Wis. 144, 210 N. V. 364.
16(1927) 4 Wis. L. Rev. 220.
17(1924) 2 Wis. L. Rev. 439.
"sOconto Co. v. Bacon, (1923) 181 Wis. 538, 195 N. V. 412, 40
A. L. R. 175.
19First Nat'l Bank v. Agnew, (1878) 45 Wis. 131; Superior Con-
solidated Land Co. v. Nichols, (1892) 81 Wis. 656, 51 N. W. 878;
Nelson v. Jacobs, (1898) 99 Wis. 547, 75 N. W. 406; Dickson v. Loehr,
(1906) 126 Wis. 641, 106 N. W. 793 (Remedies inconsistent and
vendor's election discussed); Fox v. Williamson, (1907) 133 Wis. 337,
113 N. W. 669.
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that the case has nothing to do with forfeitures. It is explained
that the vendee simply fails to bring himself within the field of
equitable relief. 20 If this position is taken it is simply because the
court chooses so to view it. Where a vendee has made large
payments, perhaps all but the last, and in addition has added
lasting improvements to the land, and the court decrees a strict
foreclosure against such vendee, who, at that time, for reasons
beyond his control is economically helpless, an assertion by the
court that this has nothing to do with forfeitures is a denial of an
obvious fact.
A vendee in default is not, of course, in a strong position to
ask affirmative relief, and a vendor ready and willing to perforn
is. It should be remembered, however, that the equity court has
the parties before it, and that it has a large discretion in moulding
its decrees. In fact the courts in refusing to relieve against for-
feitures in such cases are standing on the idea before mentioned
that parties, sui juris, have made the contract and they must stand
by its terms,2 or as is frequently stated, a court of equity cannot
20Oconto Co. v. Bacon, (1923) 181 Wis. 538, 195 N. W. 412, 40
A. L. R. 175. As to the facts in this case the court was obviously
correct in refusing relief as the vendee was in a strikingly weak position.
See Hickman v. Long, (1914) 34 S. D. 639, 150 N. W. 298. Prof.
Ballantine in (1921) 5 MINNESOTA LAW REviv 329, 341 says: "The law,
while looking with righteous abhorrence on forfeitures, and washing its
hands of their enforcement, after the manner of Pontius Pilot, yet has
been reluctant to intervene with affirmative relief or to formulate any
consistent principle condemning the validity of cut throat provisions
which in their essence involve forfeiture. Although the law will not
assist in the vivisection of the victim, it will often permit the creditor
to keep his pound of flesh if he can carve it for himself."2
'In Benedict v. Lynch, (1815) 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 370, 376, Chan-
cellor Kent said: "The notion that seems too much to prevail that
a party may be utterly regardless of his stipulated payments, and that
a court of chancery will, almost at any time, relieve him from the
penalty of his gross negligence, is very injurious to good morals, to
a lively sense of obligation, to the sanctity of contracts, and to the
character of this court. It would be against all my impressions of the
principles of equity to help those who show no equitable title to relief."
See also Hansborough v. Peck, (1866) 5 Wall. (U.S.) 497. 18 L. Ed.
520. In Oconto Co. v. Bacon, (1923) 181 Wis. 538, 195 N. V. 412,
40 A. L. R. 175; Rosenberry, J. said:
"Parties should have some regard and respect for the terms of
their own contracts and ought to make the terms thereof conform to
their real understanding and not rely wholly or even largely upon a
court of equity for protection from their own acts. In Parsons v.
Smilie, (1893) 97 Cal. 647, 657, 32 Pac. 702 it was said: "A court of
equity cannot undertake to set aside the deliberate contracts or obliga-
tions of parties fairly and freely assumed because time may show that
the obligation was onerous or unprofitable." Also Sorum v. Sorensen,
(1922) 45 S. D. 313, 187 N. W. 423.
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make contracts for the parties. The vendor, in instituting a suit
for strict foreclosure, however, recognizes the contract as still
subsisting only for the purpose of the suit and to get rid of the
vendee's equity.
The reason for the default by the vendee is immaterial. It
would be agreed that if he failed to perform because of ignorance,
surprise, fraud, accident or mistake that he would receive relief,2 2
but the fact that he is the victim of an economic depression, or,
despite all human effort and best intentions, is simply unable to
meet the payment, or that the vendor is anxious for an excuse to
declare the forfeiture23 owing to his advantageous position, the
economic forces having worked in his favor, these are all imma-
terial considerations. Professor Ballantine concludes that:
"By the great weight of American authority no relief can be
afforded against express conditions precedent inflicting forfeiture
where the contract makes time of the essence, although the delay
may be very slight and although the buyer has paid a large part of
the price and has greatly improved the land. The vendor is entitled
to the land, with all improvements, fixtures and growing crops,
and in addition to the purchase money already paid."2'
In Nelson Realty Co. v. Seeman,2 although the vendee was
killed in France in the war and his administrator pleaded nothing
in the estate with which to meet the remaining payments, and the
payments made exceeded the vendor's damage, the Minnesota
court denied any relief against forfeiture because the contract
called for same. The record of the case shows that the vendor
actually profited by.the breach. The trial court found the vendor's
damage was $257, while the amount forfeited was $1000. Thus
the vendor made a profit of $743 for which the vendee's estate
received nothing.16
2240 A. L. R. 182; Oconto Co. v. Bacon, (1923) Wis. 538, 195
N. W. 412, 40 A. L R. 175; 1 Pom. Eq. Juris. 451.
23'.UcDonald v. Kingsbury, (1911) 16 Cal. App. 244, 116 Pac. 381;
Durfee & Durfee, Foreclosure of Land Contracts, (1896) 7 Mich. St.
Bar Ass'n J. 166, 169, "Where the purchaser has made large payments
and valuable improvements and the vendor has a correspondingly com-
fortable margin of security and especially where the default of the
purchaser is not deliberate but is either due to oversight or to misfor-
tune beyond his control, he deserves and is likely to get, in any court
of equity, indulgence by way of specific enforcement of the contract,
upon his making good his default"
24(1921) 5 MINNESOTA LAW REviEw 345.
25(1920) 147 Minn. 354, 180 N. XV. 227. See comment by Prof.
Ballantine, (1921) 5 MINNEsoTA LAW REvrEw 329, also (1921) 5
MINNESOTA LAW REvmw 466.
26(1921) 5 MiNNmsoTA LAw REviEw 466.
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Another Tinnesota case strikingly illustrates the same doc-
trine.2 7 The action was one of specific performance, but the court
admitted that as presented it virtually amounted to one for strict
foreclosure. The defendant was obligated in a mortgage which
plaintiff owned in the sum of $15,000 and could not pay. It was
agreed that the plaintiff would foreclose and buy in the land, which
he did, paying $16,063.90. The defendant agreed to pay this sum,
and, on account, he paid $5,515.90. Time was extended for final
payment. The hard times of 1893 and following intervened, and
the defendant could not meet the payments even on the new date.
The land was worth at the time of this action only $5000, so that
a depreciation of several thousand dollars was absorbed by the
defendant. The trial court found that there was due the plaintiff
$13,344.44 and set a ninety-day period for payment. The defend-
ant failed to comply. The plaintiff by the default of the defend-
ant, thus became the owner of the land by virtue of a strict fore-
closure and in addition the court entered a judgment of $8,344.44
against the defendant. The net result was that in addition to the
depreciation which the vendee should properly bear, he lost the
payment of $5,515.90, the land worth $5000, and is obligated to
the plaintiff in a judgment of $8,344.44. If this case were one
of strict foreclosure and the court states that "it so treats it," the
judgment in addition to forfeiture seems clearly wrong. It would
seem the decree of strict foreclosure should terminate the con-
tract .2  Such cases show adherence to the "sanctity of contract,"
27London & Northwest Am. Mortgage Co. v. McMillan, (1899) 78
Minn. 53, 80 N. W. 841.2 8 n Kunz v. Whitney, (1918) 167 Wis. 446, 167 N. W. 747, the
court said: "When the plaintiff took the land he thereby relieved the
defendants from an unperformed obligation of the contract, for he
could not have both the land and also the future benefits secured by
the contract." See also (1896) 7 Mich. St. Bar Ass'n J. 166, 176:
"Strict foreclosure, however, has been held to be in the nature of a
rescission of the contract, terminating the personal obligation." Waite
v. Stanley, (1913) 88 Vt. 407, 92 Atl. 633, a divided court ruled against
a deficiency judgment. Court said: "The contract is cancelled by the
decree or judgment of the court-There is no longer any consideration
for the vendee's promise to pay the purchase price." Cross v. Mayo,(1914) 167 Cal. 594, 140 Pac. 283. After strict foreclosure a decree
for the price was error.
NoTE ON THE EFFEcr OF VENDOR'S DECLARING FORFEITURE
Of course, where vendor declares a forfeiture he cannot thereafter
sue on any check which is given to evidence future payment. Such
termination of the contract destroys the consideration for such. 30
A. L. R. 631. Portues v. Tanner, (1923) 30 Wyo. 85, 216 Pac. 1069.
Vendor may sue for purchase price or portion due, 39 Cyc. 1900 or
damages for breach, 13 Cyc. 651. If, however, the note is taken for
down payment it may be enforced, as it is treated as cash. Bible v.
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and should stimulate a "livelv sense of obligation,"- but they seem
to carry the contract doctrine to such extreme limits as to work
severe hardships and injustice.
The English courts have developed a much more liberal rule
respecting the forfeiture of payments made by vendees. The.
leading case is Steedinan v. Drinkle.3 After pointing out that
the penalty would become more and more severe as performance
approached completion, the true theory is held to be that "the
purchase money paid is to be regarded only as security for the
true amount of damages which the vendor had suffered by the
purchaser's breach."'" All that the vendor can justly insist upon
is an ample margin of security and this the English view preserves
for him.
A difference is made in England, however, between a deposit
and subsequent payments in this respect. The former is made at
the time the contract is entered into and is a guaranty of perform-
ance by the vendee. Such deposit is forfeited if vendee defaults
even in the absence of an express forfeiture clause32: On the
whole, if the amount of the deposit is not unreasonably large this
seems a fair result because the vendor may have given up the
opportunity to sell to others by virtue of his contract with the
defendant,33 and the measure of his damage would be highly
Fisher, (1927) 192 Wis. 545, 213 N. W. 309; Mulcahy v. Gagliardo,
(1919) 39 Cal. App. 458, 179 Pac. 445; Thompson v. Killheffer, (1923)
99 N. J. L. 439, 119 AtI. 770. But see Epstein v. Rosenfield, (1923)
222 Mich. 358, 192 N. W. 717. Where vendee gave two checks totaling
$500 as cash payment. When presented there were no funds in bank,
vendee abandoned and vendor sold land to another party for $500 less
than defendant agreed to pay and sought to enforce checks. He could
not sue on notes. So a judgment recovered by vendor for portion of
purchase price, before the declaration of forfeiture, cannot be enforced.
Judgment not thought to place parties in any different position. Warren
v. Ward. (1904) 91 Minn. 254, 97 N. XV. 886; Ward v. Warren, (1903)
44 Or. 102, 74 Pac. 482; Gibbons v. Crozens, (1897) 29 Ont. Rep. 356.
-9See footnote 21 for quotation from Kent, C.
30[1916]1 A. C. 275.31Prof. Ballantine, (1922) 6 MIxxEsoTA LAW REVIEW 329, 347. It is
interesting to contrast with this view the position taken by the
Pennsylvania court in Sanders v. Brock, (1911) 230 Pa. St. 609. 79 Atl.
772, 35 L. R. A. (N.S.) 532. The vendee had paid $2.000, and, after
default, the vendor sold the land for a higher price than the vendee
agreed to pay. The vendor was allowed to keep the payments, although
it seems obvious that he gained by the defalcation instead of suffering
any damage. See also a like result in Nelson Real Estate Agency
v. Seeman, (1920) 147 Minn. 354, 180 N. XV. 227.3
-Harrison v. Holland, (1922] 1 K. B. 211. See, (1923) 156 L. T. 311.
33(1924) 158 L. T. 23. In Great West Lumber Co. v. Wilkins,
(1907) 1 Alberta L. R. 155, the court "unhesitatingly" held with Howe
v. Smith, (1884) 27 Ch. Div. 89, that a deposit, although taken as part pl%,-
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uncertain. It would seem, however, that even a deposit could be
so large as to amount to a forfeiture, in which case the usual
relief against penalties should be applied. 4 Greedy vendors have
not been satisfied with the retention of deposits only and they
have stipulated for a sacrifice of payments also. The Steedman
Case3" establishes the rule in England as to such forfeitures. How-
ever, the vendee cannot recover any payments made in an action at
law.
3 6
In some of the Canadian provinces these contracts have
received considerable attention and some very interesting results
and striking methods of handling the problem have been devel-
oped. Strict foreclosure seems never to be allowed to destroy a
vendee's interest if a forfeiture will result. In Canadian Pacific v.
Meadows37 the vendee had paid $400 on a price of $960 and then,
for some reason not revealed, defaulted and the vendor sought to
cut off the vendee's interest, the land having greatly depreciated
in value. The court fixed a new day on which vendee should pay
the balance. Judge Beck, in the course of an interesting opinion,
said: "I am of opinion, in view of the likelihood based on com-
ment, was a guaranty of performance and a vendee in default forfeits it,
but that rule applied only to a deposit and not to a payment in install-
ments.
34(1917) 53 Can. L. J. 82.35Steedman v. Drinkle, [1916] A. C. 275.36Harrison v. Holland, [1922] 1 K. B. 211. Mayson v. Clouet,
[1924] A. C. 980, 69 Sol. J. 267, 791.
NOTE ON VENDEE'S RECOVERY OF PURCHASE MONEY WiiEN HE Is IN
DEFAULT
A vendee in default cannot, by the great weight of authority, main-
tain an action to recover payments made in quasi contract or other-
wise. 2 Williston, Contracts, sec. 791 and 3 Williston, Contracts, sec.
1476 and cases cited; (1927) 36 Yale L. J. 580; Woodward, Quasi
Contracts 177; 59 A. L. R. 189; Perkins v. Allunt, (1913) 47 Mont. 13,
130 Pac. 1; M'Mames v. Blackmarr, (1891) 47 Minn. 331, 50 N. W. 230;
Hansborough v. Peck, (1866) 5 Wall. (U.S.) 97, 18 L. Ed. 520; List
v. Moore, (1912) 20 Cal. App. 616, 129 Pac. 962; Edgerton v. Peckham,
(1844) 11 Paige Ch. (N.Y.) 352; Glock v. Howard & Wilson Colony
Co., (1898) 123 Cal. 1, 55 Pac. 713, 43 L. R. A. 199, 69 Am. St. Rep.
17; (1921) 5 MINNE OTA LAW REVIEW 466. "It would seem only just
that where the amount paid by the vendee is much greater than the
actual damage sustained by the vendor, the vendee should be allowed
to recover the difference in an action in the nature of quasi contract.
where the default is inadvertent and not wilful and not made in bad
faith and where the vendee does not repudiate the contract." A
striking case refusing vendee relief is Nelson Real Estate Co. v. Seeman,
(1920) 147 Minn. 354, 180 N. W. 227.
37(1908) 1 Alberta L. R. 344. The prayer for relief was omnibus.
(1) payment of amount due, (2) if not paid, that payments previously
made be forfeited and agreement rescinded and possession surrendered,
(3) that all interest, etc., of defendant be foreclosed.
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mon knowledge, that the land in question is worth probably more
than twice the original purchase price of $960.00," and that the
vendor be confined to his remedy by sale. He continued:
"I think the court ought in every case to consider the interest
of all parties who may be affected by its judgment, and, if it can
do so without injustice to the plaintiff, it has pow'er and ought
to exercise it to refuse a form of relief to which the plaintiff is
prima facie entitled and give him another form of relief to which
he is also entitled, if by so doing the interests of the other parties
will thereby be better conserved." 3ss
The court was operating under a statute9 which seems merely
declaratory of the equity rule; "Subject to appeal as in other cases
the court shall have power to relieve against penalties and forfei-
tures." The idea that the matter was procedural and not an issue
of expressed substantive contracual rights was vigorously dissented
from by Stuart, J. After pointing out that vendee's rights are an
interest in the land to the extent of the purchase price paid and on
payment of the balance a right to specific performance, he declared
that he "could not agree that when the court lays its own hands
upon the property and orders a sale, calling in a new purchaser
and forcing a new agreement, it is thereby merely preserving
from destruction the purchaser's rights under the agreement."
He said: "By ordering a sale the court gives the purchaser some-
thing vastly different from his rights under the agreement.""0
Even more striking, however, is the case of Mortgage Co. of
Canada v. Filer"' where the court went the extreme limit in order
to protect a vendee caught in an economic depression with a land
contract. It is the more interesting in contrast with the above
case, because the lands here had depreciated, a more common
factual situation, whereas in the Canadian Pacific Case they had
inwreased in value. The defendant had agreed to pay $328,445
for the land. The value had seemingly depreciated to $271,500
or even less, the valuers not agreeing on the amount. Despite
38Italics are writer's.
39Alberta, Statutes 1907, ch. 5, secs. 7 and 8.
40Even the dissenting judge was willing to go much farther than
our American courts which retain strict foreclosure, for he said: "There
should be a reference to the clerk to fix the amount due to the plaintiff
for principal, interest and costs" and a day for payment be fixed, "and
upon non-payment" plaintiff entitled to rescission, "but such order
should be accomplished with a reference to the clerk to ascertain the
amounts paid to the plaintiff on account of the purchase money and to
ascertain the rental value of the premium during the time the defendant
has been in possession." Foreclosure by sale seemed to be assumed.
41(1922) 18 Alberta L. R. 367.
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some payments, the vendee, because of interest and taxes, owed
$331,000 and he was hopelessly unable to pay. Moreover, there
were many sub-purchasers whose interests were involved. The
vendor obtained an order "for the determination of the agree-
ment and for a forfeiture of all the rights of the purchaser,"
virtually a strict foreclosure, as the cantract empowered him to do.
The court assumed that the usual practice was to put the property
up for sale and foreclose the vendee's interests in that method.
But it took cognizance of the fact that under the economic con-
ditions then existing the land would not sell for "anything like the
amount remaining unpaid," which would be unfair to vendor, in
not preserving to him an ample margin of security. 1 lence the
contract must be strictly foreclosed. The court, however, was
unwilling to leave the vendee and the sub-purchasers, who had not
received title, without some protection and added to the fore-
closure decree the following order:
" . . . reserving liberty to the defendant to apply in this action
whenever so advised, to have an inquiry as to the actual damage
suffered by the vendor through his default and to be relieved from
any mere forfeiture that the plaintiff may be retaining.""
The order was explained by the court thus:
"But with the rapid fluctuation of values in farm lands which
we know do take place in this country, I think the court ought to
contemplate the possibility, that in spite of the present depression,
the value of the land may shortly rapidly increase and that the
vendor, after being placed as it will be by the order now confirmed
in a position to resell as it pleases and to give title, may ultimately
realize far more than is now expected out of the lands. I do not
think indeed that the vendor should ever be called upon to account
for the whole amount that it may realize over and above what was
due from the purchaser. That would be placing it in the position
of a trustee or receiver. But I think its rights finally to retain
as and by way of liquidated damages the amounts received from
the purchaser should be subject to revision by the court upon the
application of the purchaser. If it should turn out that the vendor
realized in full out of resales the whole amount which the defen-
dant agreed to pay, then the vendor would have suffered no dam-
ages by the defendant's default and there would have been a for-
feiture from which the court might relieve the defendant."
The liberal doctrine of the English court before noted and
its equitable result have been approximated in many of our Ameri-
can courts through a rather strained meaning given to rescission,"
421talics the writer's.4 3LytIe v. Scottish-Am. Mortgage Co., (1905) 122 Ga. 458, 50 So.
402; (1921) 5 MINNESOTA LAw REVIEW 349; Morris v. Letchworth, (1912)
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and in others by an easy facility for discovering waivers," but the
readiness of some of the Canadian courts to act in relieving
against forfeitures either by virtue of an inherent power of equity
or by codifying statutory authorization stands in startling contrast
to the attitude of a few American courts. Statutes conferring
power upon these courts to act have not only not been utilized.
but by construction they have been rendered, to a greater or less
degree, useless.
The enabling act referred to, which has been adopted in at
least four states4 a was first proposed in the David Dudley Field
Code in New York. It is as follows:
"Whenever, by the terms of an obligation, a party thereto in-
curs a forfeiture, or loss in the nature of a forfeiture, by reason
of his failure to comply with its provisions, he may be relieved
therefrom, upon making full compensation to the other party,
except in case of a grossly negligent, wilful or fraudulent breach
of duty."
Such statutory provision as has been pointed out," was badly
needed and under, it the condition of a vendee even though in
default unless "grossly negligent, wilful or fradulent," should be
very considerably improved.
The first case,46 in California, to construe this statute, while
not one of strict foreclosure, is important for our purposes in
that it more or less fixed the court's attitude toward the legisla-
tion and it has controlled in the foreclosure cases. The plaintiff
was developing a large tract of land and, to facilitate prospective
customers in their building operations, lie was desirous of having
a lumber yard in the vicinity. Accordingly, he sold the lot in
167 Mo. App. 553, 152 S. W. 421 (where vendee was allowed directly
to recover amount of price paid less damages to vendor); Waters v.
Pearson, (1914) 163 Iowa 391, 144 N. W. 1026; Pierce v. Staub, (190
78 Conn. 459, 62 AtI. 760; Frink v. Thomas, (1891) 20 Or. 265, 25 Pac.
717; Howard v. Stillwagon, (1911) 232 Pa. St. 625, 81 Atd. 807; See
(1924) 2 Tex. L. Rev. 496, (1929) 7 Tex. L. Rev. 294, (1922) 6 M ixE-
sorA LAW REvIEW 422.
44See 33 Harv. L. Rev. 952 for authorities on waivers.
44aCal. Civ. Code 1906 sec. 3275; Montana, Rev. Code, sec. 6039; N. D.
Compiled Code, 1913 sec. 7138; S. D. Rev. Code, 1919, sec. 1958. It is
possible that Oklahoma has a similar statute although the writer has
not found it. It seems to be referred to in (1922) 32 Yale L. J. 66,
note 6 and incidentally in the Oklahoma court's surprising construction
thereof to the effect that by inserting the clause in the contract the
parties were equally guilty and hence the law would help neither of
them to recover either the money or the land. Kershaw v. Hurtt,
(1917) 66 Okla. 117, 168 Pac. 202.
45(1921) 5 MIlNNESOTA LAW REVIEw 329, 350.
4"Parsons v. Smilie, (1893) 97 Cal. 647, 32 Pac. 702.
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question to the defendant, who paid $1073.60, a fair price. It was
stipulated in the contract of sale that the defendant should operate
a lumber yard for five years with express provisions for forfeiture
of all payments in case of default. At the time the contract was
made a land boom existed which soon subsided and the lumber
yard, having become useless, was discontinued after about a year.
The plaintiff entered for breach of condition and brought an
action to compel a reconveyance of the lot and to quiet his title.
The defendant insisted on the return of the payment relying oi
the statute quoted and expressly offered to compensate the defend-
ant for any damage he might have suffered from the breach. Tile
trial court had found that there was no damage. The supreme
court denied relief to the vendee, holding that these facts did not
come within the statute. It was stated that the problem was not
one of the enforcing forfeitures which equity will not do, but
that the question was how far equity shall interfere to defeat
a forfeiture for violation of a condition subsequent. The statute
was treated as a mere codification of the equity rule for relief
against forfeitures. This rule was stated to be that where parties
have made time of the essence and inserted the express stipula-
tion, equity cannot interfere.4 7 Furthermore, it was held that as
the breach was as to a collateral matter 48 there was no measure by
which equity could determine the damage caused by the breach.
The court thought it was quite immaterial that the trial court had
found that there was no damage to the plaintiff owing to the fact
that the boom had spent itself and the lumber yard had become
useless. It was then concluded that:
"A court of equity cannot undertake to set aside deliberate
contracts or obligations of parties fairly and freely assumed be-
cause time may show that the obligation was onerous or un-
profitable."
Legislative assistance by means of the enabling statute Was
ineffective to secure any different result. To this the suggestion
seems cogent that equity relieved against precisely similar stipula-
tions in the case of mortgages. The mortgagor and mortgagee
were not allowed to place clogs on the equity of redemption no
matter how fairly and freely they acted or how deliberately they
assumed the obligation. The net result of the decision was that
this statute was made to conform to the court's rather narrow view
471 Pomeroy, Eq. Juris. 2d ed., 455.
4l Washburn, Real Prop. 23; Henry v. Tupper, (1857) 29 Vt. 358.
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of what equity should do in such cases without statutory assist-
ance.
This interpretation of the statute has had its effect upon the
foreclosure cases. The courts under it have never preserved the
vendee's interests sua sponte, as the Alberta court did. On the
contrary, he is compelled to seek relief under the statute by affir-
mative action. 49
Encouraged doubtless by the success encountered in avoiding
the obvious intent of this statute but occasionally seeing their
contract rights, so carefully fabricated, defeated, by a discovery on
the part of the court of a waiver by their own conduct, vendors
*soon learned to add another cut throat provision to their contracts.
The following provision taken from a recent case is illustrative:
the waiver of any breach by the ve ndor "shall not be deemed or
held to; be a waiver of any subsequent or other breach of said
convenant or agreement, nor a waiver of any other covenant or
agreement herein contained."' The California appellate court in
dealing with such a stipulation adhered to the view that parties
capable of contracting can make their own contracts with which
a court of equity cannot interfere. A forfeiture was enforced
against the vendee, the court ignoring the statute.
A final blow was administered to the statute in a foreclosure
case"' by excluding from its operation all contracts in which time
is made the essence of the contract. This result was reached by
construing this statute with another section " of the code which
expressly excepted contracts where time has been made of the
49Clifford v. Fleshman, (1924) 65 Cal. App. 762, 225 Pac. 45; Leah
v. Colburn, (1921) 55 Cal. App. 784, 304 Pac. 249; Taylor v. United
States F. and G. Co., (1927) 86 Cal. App. 382, 260 Pac. 898; "Appellant
did not in his answer plead any equitable matter, nor ask the court to
be relieved from a forfeiture." Acc. Subjurban Homes Co. v. North,
(1914) 50 Mont. 108, 145 Pac. 2.5
°Brown v. Land Co., (1922) 59 Cal. App. 164, 210 Pac. 424. See
(1923) 11 Calif. L. Rev. 286.
5
'Collins v. Eksoozian, (1923) 61 Cal. App. 184, 214 Pac. 670.
5-'Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 1492. "Where delay in performance is capable
of exact and entire compensation, and time has not been expressly
declared to be of the essence of the obligation, an offer of performance,
accompanied with an offer of such compensation, may be made at any
time after it is due, but without prejudice to any rights acquired by the
creditor, or by any other person, in the meantime." The following
cases are relied upon by the court as supporting this rule: Glock v.
Howard & Wilson Colony Co., (1898) 123 Cal. 1, 55 Pac. 713. 43 L. R.
A. 199, 69 Am. St. Rep. 17; Grey v. Tubbs, (1872) 43 Cal. 359; Martin
v. Morgan, (1890) 87 Cal. 203, 22 Am. St. Rep. 240, 25 Pac. 350; Woodruff
v. Semi-Tropic L & W. Co., (1890) 87 Cal. 275, 25 Pac. 354 and others.
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essence. The court decided that the same result must have been
intended by the legislature here. Some earlier cases were thought
to have intimated that equity might relieve despite the presence
of this clause, if a showing "such as would appeal to equity be
made." The court continued: "What is such a showing as would
justify equity to interpose its remedial power in favor of the
defaulting vendee in such a case none of the cases,-at least, none
coming under our immediate observation-has pointed out. But,
however this all may be, we do not think that the present case
falls within the doctrine of the rule above adverted to," even
though it was admitted by the court that the plaintiff in this case
who was seeking strict foreclosure and enforcement of forfeiture
of paymenits made-"designedly and with the intent of causing
the defendant to become in default in the matter of compliance
with a vital provision of the contract" laid a trap for the vendee.
The facts were that the defendant, an alien who did not under-
stand our tax laws and who had contracted to purchase the land
from the plaintiff, agreed to pay the taxes. He relied upon the
offer of the plaintiff to see that the tax notices reached him. The
plaintiff directed the officials to mail the notices to the defendant
in care of plaintiff. It was found as a fact that the vendor delib-
erately planned the default by concealing the receipt of the notice
from the defendant in order to effect a forfeiture of payments
made. The court refused the statutory relief to the defendaut.
ruling that the case did not come under the statutory provision.
Relief was denied to the plaintiff, however, on an equitable estop-
pel doctrine instead of granting the relief which the vendee
expressly requested under the statute.-3 The actual decision was
sound enough. There was clearly an estoppel, but the express
ruling that these facts did not justify relief under the statute was
fatal to its effective use. Certainly the field of usefulness of sec-
tion 3275 is very decidedly limited if not entirely destroyed."
53As a result of this narrow view of the statute one finds it has
been used for vendee's benefit very rarely if at all in foreclosure cases.
Odd Fellows' Savings Bank v. Brander, (1899) 124 Cal. 255, 56 I'ac.
1109; Sparks v. Hess, (1860) 15 Cal. 186; Keller v. Lewis. (1880) 56
Cal. 466; Fairchild v. Mullan, (1891) 90 Cal. 190, 27 Pac. 201: So. Pac.
Rv. Co. v. Allen, (1896) 112 Cal. 455. 44 Pac. 796; Rayfield v. Van
Mfeter, (1898) 120 Cal. 416. 52 Pac. 666. The same tendency to ignore
statutes is seen in other actions, for example actions to quiet title. Neher
v. Kauffman, (1925) 197 Cal. 674, 242 Pac. 713.
54McDonald v. Kingsbury, (1911) 16 Cal. App. 244, 116 Pac. 381
made a half hearted use of it in a case which seems quite as ttuch air
equitable estoppel as the case of Collins v. Eksoozian, (1923) 61 ('al.
App. 184, 214 Pac. 670.
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The supreme court of Montana 5 recognized that the statute
provided a remedy for the party in default by which lie might
secure relief against a forfeiture if he could allege and prove
facts upon which it would be equitable to relieve him from the
consequences of his default. To this extent it is declared to be
a modification of the general rule which denies to a defaulting
vendee any relief. Against the contention of the vendee that the
vendor-plaintiff because of the statute must offer to restore the
payments made, less his damage, as a condition to coming into
equity, it is pointed out that this remedy is not a rescission of the
contract. Instead it was one in which the vendor is relying on
the contract, no longer a vital instrument because of vendee's
breach, to enforce his right to have it terminated. In other
words, it is a strict foreclosure without the saving grace of
a new date and an opportunity to the vendee to perform. Like-
wise, in an action to remove cloud on title and terminate the
rights of the vendee the same problem is presented." The court
confesses that there would seem to be no clearer case for the
application of the statute than cases of the character here in-
volved. The contract admittedly calls for a forfeiture, but
nevertheless, by its terms is reserved to the vendor the power
to act under the contract, to terminate the same, and the only
protection the vendee has seems to be an independent action under
the statute. If this is allowed, which seems not yet decided, it
would involve needless litigation. It is not adequate protection
to terminate the contract and leave vendee to a separate action.
Finally, it seems a little significant that in this jurisdiction no
case of foreclosure of the contract was found in which any
defense under the statute was made. For some reason attorneys
in defending strict foreclosure cases seemingly hesitate to make
use of it.
In South Dakota the purpose of the section"7 is stated to
be to allow plaintiff to "recover back the money so paid, less
the amount of damages which the other party has sustained by
reason of his failure to comply with the terms of the contract.35
55Cook-Reynolds Co. v. Chipmen, (1913) 47 Mont. 289, 33 Pac. 694;
Clark v. American Development Mining Co., (1903) 28 Mont. 468, 72
Pac. 978.
56Suburban Homes Co. v. North, (1914) 50 Mont. 108, 145 Pac. 2.
57S. D. Code 1919, sec. 1958.
5SBarnes v. Clement, (1896) 8 S. D. 421, 12 S. D. 270, 81 N. XV. 30;
Way v. Johnson, (1894) 5 S. D. 237, 58 N. W. 552.
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An express stipulation for a forfeiture will not prevent relief,
and the court declared that the statute should be applied in all
cases which can be brought within its provisions. But if the
vendor seeks to quiet his title as against the contract 9 or a strict
foreclosure"0 is sought, the statute does not apply as by the view
of the court no forfeiture problem is then presented.
In North Dakota thei statutory provision"1 does not seem to
have been resorted to very frequently by defaulting vendees. In
the cases in which the section has been utilized the facts have been
pretty strongly in favor of the vendee.0 2  Some significance may
be attached to the fact that the commission codifying the laws
of 1913 in North Dakota cite under this section the case of
Parsons v. Sem'ille 3 in California already shown to have rendered
the section ineffective.
This review of the treatment which this section of the Field
code, rejected in New Ybrk, has received at the hands of the
courts in the states where it has been made a part of the statute
law, shows that it has not been effective in protecting the default-
ing vendee. In foreclosure cases it has been treated as inappli-
cable. When a court of equity refuses to do equity in an exercise
of an inherent power, a statute attempting to confer the power
upon the court will likely receive scant consideration. It is
difficult to see how the legislatures could have been more specific,
but apparently sometlhing more in legislation is necessary0 4 before
59 Bates v. Loffler, (1911) 28 S. D. 228, 133 N. W. 283. The supreme
court modified the trial court's decree for plaintiff by fixing a period
of ninety days within which the vendee could perform, but in event
of failure, his interests are cut off and title quieted in plaintiff. In other
words strict foreclosure. Court does not consider this a rescission, in
which case the payments would be returned, but an action to foreclose
and refused any relief to vendee under the statute.
60 Hickman v. Long, (1914) 34 S. D. 639, 150 N. W. 298; Taylor
v. Martin, (1927) 51 S. D. 536, 215 N. W. 695. Court ignores the for-
feiture statute, indeed it is not raised at all, for the reason that strict
foreclosure is thought to have nothing to do with a forfeiture, just as
in Oconto Co. v. Bacon, (1923) 181 Wis. 538, 195 N. W. 412, 40 A. L.
R. 175.
61N. D. Comp..L. 1913, sec. 7138.62Bennett v. Glaspell, (1906) 15 N. D. 239, 107 N. W. 45; Johnston
Farm Investment Co. v. Huff, (1925) 52 N. D. 589, 204 N. W. 333.
Attorneys in this case relied largely on Oconto Co. v. Bacon, (1923)
181 Wis. 538, 195 N. W. 412, 40 A. L. R. 175 which said there was no
forfeiture. The court found facts favorable to vendee.03Parsons v. Smilie, (1893) 97 Cal. 647, 32 Pac. 702.64
"It should not be admitted that a court of equity has an inferior
instinct for natural justice or an inferior power to give effect to it than
chancellors possessed three centuries ago." 2 Williston, Contracts, see.
773.
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the vendee in these jurisdictions can be considered as adequately
protected against forfeiture.
In Nebraska, Oregon, California, Minnesota and possibly
Iowa,6" whether the vendee's rights shall be foreclosed strictly or
by sale, is in the discretion of the court. Quite early in Nebraska
strict foreclosure was recognized as a remedy open to the vendor."
In Harrington v. Birdsall,67 however, the court announced a
doctrine which has become the pattern for it and other courts.
"The remedy by strict foreclosure of land contracts cannot
be resorted to in all cases. The remedy being a harsh one, courts
of equity will decree a strict foreclosure only under peculiar and
special circumstances. Applications of that character are addressed
to the sound legal discretion of the court, and they will be granted
in cases where it would be inequitable to refuse them. If the
vendee or purchaser has not been guilty of gross ladies, nor un-
reasonably negligence in performing the contract, a strict fore-
closure should be refused on the ground that it would be unjust.
even though the vendee may have been slightly in default in mak-
ing of a payment. So, for the same reason, a strict foreclosure
will be denied where the premises have greatly increased in value
since the sale, or where the amount of unpaid purchase money is
much less than the value of the property. On the other hand, if
the vendee, without sufficient excuse, fails to make his payments
according to the stipulations of his contract, and for an unreason-
able time remains in default, the vendor may have a strict fore-
closure-unless some principle of equity would be thereby
violated."
The rule announced by Dean Pound" approves this discretionary
doctrine. He says:
"Strict foreclosure should only be permitted where no sub-
stantial payment has been made, or where the present value of the
land is less than the amount due vendor, or where-purchaser
having made improvements under the contract, vendor elects to
pay for them."
65Carns v. Sexsmith, (1922) 193 Iowa 1080, 188 N. W. 657. Thefoundation case in California, Sparks v. Hess, (1850) 15 Cal. 186 recog-
nizes that strict foreclosure was an optional remedy with the vendor.
See also Kellar v. James, (1878) 53 Cal. 113. Speaking of vendor's reme-
dies court said: "If payments are not made when due, he may, if out
of possession, bring his ejectment and recover possession, but if he
comes into equity for relief his better remedy, in case of persistent
default on part of vendee, is to institute proceedings to foreclose the
right of the vendee to purchase." Fairchild v. Mullan, (1891) 90 Cal.
190, 27 Pac. 201; So. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Allen, (1896) 112 Cal. 455, 44 Pac.
796; Gates v. Green, (1907) 151 Cal. 65, 90 Pac. 189; Denton v. Scully,(1879) 26 Minn. 325, 4 N. W. 41.
"Foster v. Ley, (1891) 32 Neb. 404, 49 N. XV. 450; Gallagher v.
Giddings, (1891) 33 Neb. 222, 49 N. W. 1126.67(1893) 38 Neb. 176,-56 N. W. 961.
68(1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 834.
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The Nebraska rule would seem quite sufficient to protect the de-
faulting vendee but one finds some seemingly inequitable results
in its application to fact situations as they come before the courts
and the same tendency to deal rather harshly with vendees. A few
Nebraska cases will be found in the note. 9
The supreme court of Oregon followed the Nebraska doctrine
quoted above, but went a little further in limiting its application
by declaring "strict foreclosure is the exception not the rule."' "
This court, also, seems willing to enter a decree of strict fore-
closure in cases where the report of the case does not show
adequately that the equities are adjusted and it sometimes seems
to act without sufficient evidence. For instance, in the Flanagan
Estate Case7 1 the vendee paid $13,250 on a $50,000 purchase
price and the court foreclosed the interest strictly without reveal-
ing anything received by vendee for his $13,250 in way of value
of use, depreciation in value or otherwise. The same tendency is
seen in Suburban Homes Co. v. North.72  The court admitted
that there was no evidence of the value of the improvements
alleged to have been made by the vendee, or even of the amount
paid by him. Nevertheless a sweeping decree was rendered for
the vendor. Such important facts should not be left to inference.
The theory of the Oregon court, however, is not free from
doubt, for in 1911, the court decided a case 73 which seems to
announce an entirely contra principle and to follow Button v.
Schroyer7 4 The trial court had apparently directed a foreclosure
c9In Farmers Bank v. Thornburg, (1898) 54 Neb. 782, 75 N. W. 45,
purchase price was $2000. $200 cash and $560 deferred payments were
made. Vendee was in default for but short time. Evidence not con-
vincing that amount of depreciation in land values equalled the pay-
ments made. Contract had to weather depression of 1893. Strict fore-
closure granted. The facts in Harrington v. Birdsall, (1893) 38 Neb.
176, 56 N. W. 961 doubtless warranted strict foreclosure. Patterson v.
Mikkelson, (1910) 86 Neb. 512, 125 N. W. 1104. "The plaintiff has
paid less than 1/ of the purchase price of the land, had refused to
complete his contract, does not ask permission to do so and has deliv-
ered possession of the farm to the defendant. Under the circumstances
we think the defendant is entitled to a decree of strict foreclosure of
his contract." Sponsler v. Max, (1925) 113 Neb. 477, 203 N. W. 566 ($1000
paid on a $10,700 contract price). The opinion leaves one in doubt
about the equities of the parties, yet foreclosure decreed.
70Flanagan Est. v. Great Cent. Land. Co., (1904) 45 Or. 335. 77
Pac. 485; See also Security Sav. Co. v. Mackenzie, (1898) 33 Or. 209,
52 Pac. 1046.
7'(1904) 45 Or. 335, 77 Pac. 485.
72Suburban Homes Co. v. North, (1914) 50 Mont. 108. 145 Pac. 2.73Miles v. Hemenway, (1911) 59 Or. 318, 111 Pac. 696, 117 Pac.
273.
74(1856) 5 Wis. 598.
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by sale. Commenting on this decree, Moore, C. J., said:
"The same conclusion has been reached by the court of last
resort of a sister state, where it was held that as the title to the
land, agreed to be sold and conveyed, did not pass to the purchaser,
that part of a decree foreclosing the vendor's equitable lien which
directed a sale of the premises and a recovery of any deficiency,
was erroneous."
The case of Sievers v. Brown" which held that there should be a
decree directing a sale was disapproved, the learned judge saying
that while it "might be an expression of equitable principle, it
must be regarded as inconsistent with the current of judicial enu-
meration." On a, rehearing the case was remanded but not with
any denial of principles announced but on a rather strained con-
struction of the terms of the contract. Such seems clearly an
approval of the doctrine of Button v. Schroycr.0 A decision by
the same judge who wrote the opinion in Milcs v. Hem cn-
way,7 however, seems equally strong for the opposite principle.
In this case he said:
"The justice of the rule, announced in England and followed
in Wisconsin, may well be doubted, and particularly so when the
vendor received a large portion of the purchase money; in which
case equity would seem to demand that the premises be sold to
satisfy the balance due on the contract, upon the payment of which
the vendee should be entitled to the remainder of the money de-
rived from such sale."7' s
Many cases indicate, however, that the discretion rule prevails in
Oregon, in spite of this seeming contradiction.' 9 On the whole, the
75(1899) 34 Or. 454, 56 Pac. 171. The judge said in this case, how-
ever, that it was unnecessary to decide the point.
-6(1856) 5 Wis. 598.
77(1911) 59 Or. 318, 111 Pac. 696, 117 Pac. 273.78Sievers v. Brown, (1899) 34 Or. 454, 56 Pac. 171, approved in
Vance v. Blakeley, (1912) 62 Or. 326, 123 Pac. 390.
79Security Savings Bank v. Mackenzie, (1898) 33 Or. 209, 52 Pac.
1046; Gray v. Perry, (1895) 25 Or. 1, 34 Pac. 1091. In Hawkins v.
Rogers, (1919) 91 Or. 483, 179 Pac. 565, court very properly made decree
of strict foreclosure conditioned upon vendor's paying for improvements
made by vendee. If he elects to take back land seems fair to pay for
improvements. Sheehan v. McKinstry, (1922) 105 Or. 473, 210 Pac.
167 (one-third of price paid.) Court said: "Nothing has been alleged
or even suggested which makes it inequitable in this case to grant the
remedy of strict foreclosure; therefore under the facts alleged and
proved it was error for the court to refuse the plaintiff the remedy
of strict foreclosure." The opinion does not reveal why it was not
inequitable. But as it stands the court seems to be cutting off vendee'.
equitable interests predicated upon the payment of $6000 without ex-
planation. Anderson v. Hurlbert, (1923) 109 Or. 284. 119 Pac. 102
(vendee who paid over half was refused recovery of payments, and
the vendor in cross-action was given strict foreclosure. Vendee. how-
ever, was in pretty weak position). Anderson v. Mores, (1924) 110
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vendee does not seem to receive equal protection with the vendor
in the application of the court's discretion rule. It should be
stated by way of caution, however, that data are not available from
which to determine with certainty the efficiency of the administra-
tion of this discretion rule in any of the states where it applies.
It is a discretion in the trial court8 and the relatively few cases
which get into the appellate courts do not furnish adequate data
for a determination of the problem, particularly since an appellate
court hesitates to question an exercise of discretion on the part
of the trial court.
There is a body of statutes, of which the Minnesota provision
is fairly typical, which the courts seem also 'to have construed
against the vendees to a greater or less degree.
"When default is made in the conditions of any contract for
the conveyance of real estate or any interest therein, whereby the
vendor has a right to terminate the same, he may do so by serv-
ing upon the purchaser, his personal representatives or assigns.
either within or without the state, a notice specifying the con-
ditions in which default has been made, and stating that such
contract will terminate thirty days after the service of such notice
unless prior thereto the purchaser shall comply with such con-
ditions and pay the costs of service. . . .If within the time men-
tioned the person served complies with such conditions and pays
the cost of service, the contract shall be thereby reinstated; but
otherwise shall terminate." 8'
The supreme court of Minnesota has recently explained the
purpose of this statute.8 2 It is pointed out that before the statute
if time were made of the essence of the contract and the vendee
defaulted, the vendor could forfeit the contract without notice;
if time were not of the essence, the vendor, by giving reasonable
notice, could make it so. "This statute," said the court, "takes
from the vendor in all cases the arbitrary power to terminate the
contract without notice."
Strict foreclosure was early recognized as a remedy available
to the vendor,8 3 in Minnesota, and later it was held to rest entirely
within the discretion of the court, depending on the fact situation,
Or. 39, 222 Pac. 1083; Vance v. Blakeley, (1912) 62 Or. 326, 123 Pac.
390. Circumstances justified a strict foreclosure.
SOSuperior Land Co. v. Nichols, (1892) 81 Wis. 656, 51 N. W. 878.
8Mason's Minn. St. 1927, sec. 9576. Minn. G. S. 1913, see. 8081.
Omitted portions prescribe the method of service of notice.
S2Graceville State Bank v. Hofschild, (1926) 166 Minn. 58, 206
N. W. 948.
83Drew v. Smith, (1862) 7 Minn. 301.
STRICT FORECLOSURE ON LAND CONTRACTS 363
whether the foreclosure should be strict or by sale. 4 Now the
statute, explains the supreme court: "prescribes the only way in
which the vendor may, by his own act, terminate the contract and
thereby forfeit the rights of the vendee thereunder."89  This is
no different, in its effect, from strict foreclosure,8 with the excep-
tion that the vendee has a shorter time in which to make his
payment. Its much greater convenience 7 and simplified pro-
cedure, approximating as it does self help, accounts for its frequent
use and the disappearance of the old foreclosure actions. The
court said in the Vanderpoel Case,8
"By force of the statute the contract terminated thirty days
after service of the notice given by the vendor, unless the delin-
quent payments were made prior thereto. The statute is absolute
and at the end of the prescribed time all rights of the parties under
the contract cease."
Any subsequent tender by the vendee, or prayer for specific per-
formance is ineffective 9 and apparently the extent of the damage
suffered by the vendor is an unessential incident. Thus a statute,
which in the language of the supreme court of Iowa,"0 was a
"merciful provision extending a little grace to a party in default
who may be staggering under the load of his undertaking," and,
as pointed out by Professor Ballantine,91 was designed to afford
relief against forfeitures, becomes a smoothly working device
most favorable and convenient to the vendor and deprives the
84Denton v. Scully, (1879) 26 Minn. 325, 4 N. XV. 41; Eberlein v.
Randall, (1906) 99 Minn. 528, 109 N. W. 1133.
s15Needles v. Keys, (1921) 149 Minn. 477, 184 N. XV. 33. (Italics
are writer's). "See International Realty Co. v. Vanderpoel, (1914)
127 Minn. 89, 148 N. W. 895; Nolan v. Greeley, (1921) 150 Minn.
441, 185 N. W. 647.8 International Realty Co. v. Vanderpoel, (1914) 127 Minn. 89,
148 N. W. 895; Olson v. N. P. Ry. Co., (1914) 126 Minn. 229, 148
N. W. 67.
87(1923) 7 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 255.
SSlnternational Realty Co. v. Vanderpoel, (1914) 127 Minn. 89,
148 N. W. 895.
s9CIark v. Dye, (1924) 158 Minn. 217, 197 N. W. 202. (Vendee
tendered balance within six weeks of expiration of the thirty days.)
Rejected. Court, holding proceeding was in nature of strict fore-
closure. It said: "The tender of payments after the 30 days expired,
and the tender of payments in open court, were futile. All rights
were lost by the expiration of the time in which appellant had the
right to make his payments and protect his rights." Sylvester v.
l-olasek, (1901) 83 Minn. 362, 86 N. W. 336; State Bank of Milan v.
Sylte, (1925) 162 Minn. 72, 202 N. XV. 70.9OWaters v. Pearson, (1914) 163 Iowa 391, 144 N. XV. 1026. Iowa
-Code 1924 sec. 4299. This section is to all intent and purpose the same as
the Minnesota statute quoted.
91(1921) 5 MINNESOTA LAW R vmw 351.
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vendee even of the possible gracious exercise of discretion on the
part of the court, which has hitherto been afforded him in regular
foreclosure proceedings. "2
Under a similar statute the Iowa court apparently keeps some
sort of power of adjustment of rights within its grasp. At least,
if the vendor's damages are less than the advance payments, the
court said: "We know of no sound reason of law or morals
why the vendee should not recover the balance remaining." When
a vendor elects to terminate the contract and keep the land instead
of insisting on specific performance, he must account for the
difference between advance payments and his damage. 9 3 Further-
more, it is intimated that there may be some fact situations in
which the court may control a vendor who proceeds under this
statute. In Carns v. Sexsmith the court said, " And in a proper
case the vendor may terminate the rights of the vendee by statutory
notice and declaration of a forfeiture. '9 4  It was found that it
was not error in this case to decree strict foreclosure. While it is
left to inference, it may readily be guessed, that, as the contract
was made in 1919, and the default was in 1921, that the land
depreciation, which vendee must bear, exceeded the amount of the
payments made.9  It is not explained what would be an improper
case.
The North Dakota statute9" is much more elaborate than that
in Minnesota but seems to accomplish about the same result. Just
as in Minnesota, the time allowed in the notice for performance
by the vendee, was thirty days. In 1917, however, it was extended
to six months and again, in 1921, to one year." This legislative
9 2Denton v. Scully, (1879) 26 Minn. 325, 4. N. W. 41. Strict fore-
closure can be decreed, "or if, upon consideration of the circumstances of
the case and the interest of all the parties concerned, it appears more
just and equitable to direct a sale of the defendant's interest in the lands,
or in some instances the sale of the land itself," that may be decreed in
the discretion of the court.
93Waters v. Pearson, (1914) 163 Iowa 391, 144 N. W. 1026.94Carus v. Sexsmith, (1922) 193 Iowa 1080, 188 N. W. 657.
9 Apparently the vendor can avoid the court's control if he can get
his case before it in an action to quiet title. Ashford v. Meyer, (Iowa
1910) 125 N. XV. 194. (The land contract had become a cloud ou vendor's
title.) "The action is not one for rescission, involving the necessity of
returning to defendant the purchase money paid. A forfeiture upon
breach of condition subsequent may be provided for in such a contract,
and on failure of the vendee to comply with the conditions within thirty
days after notice of intention to declare forfeiture is given, the rights of
the vendee are lost."
96N. D. Comp. Laws 1913. sees. 8119-8122 inc.9
7N. D. Laws 1917, ch. 151; Laws 1921, ch. 65; N. D. Comp. Laws
Sup., sec. 8122.
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extension of the time from thirty days to one year, considering
the conditions in agriculture during those years, is very significant.
The statute must have been working harshly. It would clearly
indicate some legislative tolerance for a vendee in default. The
supreme court refused to show any such tenderness, however, and
indicates a disposition to allow vendor to proceed according to
the strict letter of the law.9s M1r. Justice Grace vigorously attacks
the whole summary method. In the case of Lander Co. -v.
Deming,9 in a strong dissent he said:
"The arbitrary cancellation of the contract, upon notice is a law
which, in its terms and operation, is almost wholly for the benefit
of the creditor, and takes but little note of the rights of the debtor.
It is a law which enables rapacious creditors, by a mere notice, to
confiscate the equity of the vendee in the land. If valid at all, it
should receive a most liberal construction. .. ."
The court, however, seems to consider itself bound strictly by
the statute but it required the vendor strictly to comply there-
with.100 The court has on one occasion, at least called the statute
a drastic measure.' 0 '
South Dakota apparently stands alone in its statutory provi-
sion.1 -'0 It expressly codifies a strict foreclosure procedure and
then modifies it by empowering the court to "equitably adjust
the rights of all the parties." In Hickman v. Long '3 the vendee,
who had made considerable payments, demanded repayment thereof
to avoid a forfeiture, offering to compensate the vendor for the
use and occupation of the land. The court denied any relief to
him, following exactly the argument of the Wisconsin court, viz.,
strict foreclosure of land contracts is a proceeding which has
9SLander & Co. v. Deeming, (1920) 46 N. D. 273, 176 N. W. 922.
Grace, J., dissenting, in questioning the validity of such a law used this
illustration: "Assuming that A owned 320 acres of land and sold it to
B for an agreed price of $20,000 payable $1000 at the date of contract, and
$1000 on the first day of December each year thereafter, until the whole
amount was paid. Assume further that B had, each year, made his pay-
meat until he had paid $19,000 upon the contract; that he defaulted in
the payment of the 20th payment, or the last $1000. Does it seem just and
equitable that B should, upon a thirty day notice of cancellation from the
creditor, have all his admittedly vested rights and interests in the land
completely wiped out by this notice of cancellation?"
99(1920) 46 N. D. 273, 176 N. W. 922.
10oPeople State Bank v. Stenson, (1922) 49 N. D. 100, 190 N. W. 74.
3'Jolhnston Farmer Investment Co. v. Huff, (1925) 52 N. D. 589,
204 N. W. 333.
102S. D. Code 1919, sec. 2914, 15, 16.
103Hickman v. Long, (1914) 34 S. D. 639, 150 N. W. 298, "Relief
from forfeiture is in no wise involved in this action." Taylor v. Martin,
(1927) 51 S. D. 536, 215 N. W. 697.
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nothing to do with forfeitures. As has been urged, no amount
of denial on the part of the court changes the facts. It was
further stated that the contract was treated as "in full force and
affect," that performance was requested, "and it is only in case
of failure to perform within a time to be fixed by the court that
the first party asks that the contract and the second party's rights
thereunto be foreclosed." Under the statute the time allowed a
vendee in which to perform is ten days.1 0 4  It is submitted that
under economic conditions prevailing in agriculture in South
Dakota during the past decade the allowance of ten days is futile,
if the vendees interests are to be regarded. Such a period would
be absurdly short under any conditions.
It seems that the South Dakota court is particularly reluctant
to aid the vendee when it is remembered that the legislature has
expressly authorized the court to act by two statutes; one to
relieve against forfeiture,"' the other, the one under considera-
tion directing the adjustment of equities. Even the state itself
has taken advantage of the remedy, 1°0 and apparently forced a
severe loss upon a helpless but defaulting vendee. The impression
received from a reading of the decisions of that courtOT is that
the vendee in default receives but scant consideration and the
changed economic conditions are not made a basis for any con-
siderable use 'of this provision. A very good instance of the
court's attitude is the case of Sorum v. Sorensen."' 8 The contract
was made during boom conditions and admittedly a very high
price was agreed upon. The deferred payments were possible,
considering the financial condition of purchaser, only if high
prices and prosperity in agriculture then prevailing continued.
They did not continue. The vendee was unable to perform, having
104The time allowed by statute in strict foreclosure varies; 10 days
was ruled too short a period in Dickinson v. Loehr, see footnote 19. Six
months seems a very common period. Taft v. Reddy, (1926) 191 Wis.
144, 210 N. W. 364. Bladwin v. McDonald, (1916) 24 Wyo. 108, 156
Pac. 27.105S. D. Code, 1919, sec. 1958.
looSlate v. Darling, (1917) 39 S. D. 558, 165 N. W. 536. (Vendee
lost $4840 payment.)0 7Scott v. Hetland, (1927) 51 S. D. 303, 213 N. W. 732. (The court
here held that vendee's answer setting up payment of $10,000 and making
large improvement did not present equities under pleadings.) Same effect,
Moter v. Hershey, (1925) 48 S. D. 493. 205 N. W. 239; Sweet v. Purintni,
(1918) 40 S. D. 17, 166 N. W. 161; Keator v. Ferguson, (1906) 20 S. D.
473, 107 N. W. 678; Speer v. Phillips, (1909) 24 S. D. 257, 123 N. W.
724; Vendee must be given opportunity to perform. Bates v. Loffler,
(1911) 28 S. D. 228, 133 N. W. 283 (accomplished in bill to quiet title.)
208(1922) 45 S. D. 313, 187 N. W. 423.
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paid in all that he had. One must agree with the court that the
defense was not properly made and the court could rightly
have rejected it, but it seems the court was wrong in granting the
vendor's prayer for relief. It should have remanded the case for
new trial, giving the defendant aft opportunity to present his
equities properly if he had any. The feeling cannot be avoided,
however, that even if properly presented the court would have
refused to consider them. Smith, J., said:
"Both parties had equal opportunity of exercising judgment
and foresight as to the possible and probable changes in prices in
agricultural products, and lack of judgment in such matters is no
ground for releasing either party from contract obligations."
It might be observed that both parties displayed the same lack of
judgment. The judge continued:
"As well might the court of equity refuse foreclosure of a
mortgage, fair and just when entered into, because of changes in
economic conditions which might make it impossible for a mort-
gagor to pay his indebtedness."
Even in South Dakota the court would not permit the strict fore-
closure of a mortgage. A period of redemption would be allowed
even after a foreclosure by sale. Here by notice the vendor
terminates a contract against a vendee who is helpless, and, while
in many cases, in all probability, the vendee has no equities, because
of great depreciation in land values which he must bear, yet, it
would seem the court should not refuse him a hearing on them or
should not, as the case stood on appeal, enter a decree terminating
any possible interests which he might have. The only quarrel with
the South Dakota cases is that the court does not seem to utilize
their power to make an adjustment in the interest of defaulting
vendees. One knows that in most cases there is little or no equity
left in vendee, but the court should require clear evidence of that
fact and make it appear in the cases decided.
One of the surprising facts in this matter of adjustments and
protection of vendees' interests, in all the states in which strict
foreclosure of land contracts exists, is that not a single case has
been found in which a vendor is appealing from a decision of the
trial court, on the ground that judgment too favorable to the
vendee was rendered. It is believed that if trial courts were
utilizing their power to protect the vendee to any considerable
extent there would be cases in which the vendor questioned such
an adjustment. Data on which to base a dependable generalization
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are not available, but the conclusion may be ventured that default-
ing vendees are not being adequately protected by the courts. The
reason for this can only be conjectured. Perhaps it is an innate
conservatism, or even favoritism for the man who has. Certainly
it is an attempt at furthering what is considered a sound policy.
It is disappointing, however, that legislation, which, on its face,
seemed clearly designed to protect the vendee class has been con-
strued so as to work an opposite result. The cases reviewed will
be found to have originated largely in periods of economic de-
pression. The harvest of cases seems to follow remarkably closely
the depression in the business cycle. This is quite inevitable. The
unexpected happens. Events which neither party to the contract
contemplated or expressly stipulated for in the contract come to
pass. It is submitted that the court of equity should mould its
decrees with more consideration for the rights of the defaulting
vendee, and not enforce the contract even though the terms
thereof may warrant it.
